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Abstract: This paper contributes to an understanding of the historical
development of management accounting by presenting an example
of cost accounting practice in Portugal in the first half of the 18th
century. It explores the integration of cost and financial accounting
systems within a double- entry accounting framework by the Silk Factory Company (SFC) between 1745 and 1747. The SFC’s methods of
product costing, pricing, inventory accounting, expense recognition,
and production control are reviewed within the political, economic,
and social context of Portugal at the time. The SFC is revealed to have
used job-order product costing, with allocations of overhead costs,
allowances for wastage and shrinkage, and elements of rudimentary
standard costing. Our findings provide evidence of the existence of
cost accounting and management control techniques at a private
rather than a state-owned enterprise prior to the industrial revolution.

INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the management accounting system of
one of the most important Portuguese manufacturing entities
in the first half of the 18th century, the Silk Factory Company
(Companhia da Fábrica das Sedas) (SFC), during its second administration, 1745-1747 [National Archives of Portugal (Arquivos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo) (ANTT hereafter), Conselho da
Fazenda, Decretos, maço, 1699-1755; Neves, 1827, p. 41; Macedo,
Acknowledgments: The authors thank Susana Gago, Richard Fleischman,
Dick Edwards, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
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1982, p. 97]. The SFC had three administrations: the first from
October 1734 to January 1745; the second, from February 1745
to October 1747; and the third, from November 1747 to May
1750. Upon its bankruptcy in May 1750, it became state-owned
and known as the Royal Silk Factory (Real Fábrica das Sedas).
Although several books have survived from the first
administration of the company, only the accounting records
from its second administration are analyzed here because it is
only then that the company used a double-entry bookkeeping
(DEB) system. The relevant records – journal (jornal), ledger
(livro mestre), and inventory book (inventário) – were accessed
at the ANTT. These records contain rich  examples of cost accounting techniques, such as job-order costing with overhead
cost allocation.
We have three general aims: first, to explain the cost accounting system of the SFC; second, to explore the accounting
system of the SFC in the context of the ambient social, political,
and economic context of Portugal; and, third, to contribute to
an understanding of how and where management accounting
techniques developed prior to the industrial revolution.
Our exploration of the accounting system of the SFC
reveals many useful insights to the development of management accounting practice. Such insights arise because the
political, social, and economic context of Portugal during three
years of the pre-industrial period, 1745-1747, is distinctive and
under-explored in accounting history literature. The date of
the accounting records analyzed is significant also because it
precedes the first accounting book published in Portuguese,
Exact Merchant and his Books of Accounts (Mercador Exacto nos

1
José Acúrsio das Neves, manager of the Royal Silk Factory from 1810-1821,
wrote the administrative and economic history of the SFC. He described its foundation as an historic occasion because it was the most important of all factories
in Portugal and because its charter contained the same principles adopted subsequently in the monopolist companies created by King D. José I (Joseph I). The
only exception was the seventh paragraph of the charter which provided for the
taxing of exports rather than imports.
2
The ledger is accompanied by a small book containing an index of accounts
(Abecedário do Livro Mestre) in alphabetical order.

In explaining the SFC’s cost accounting system, we do not focus, as did
Macías [2002, p. 31], on exploring the role of a firm’s capital structure on “the
parameters and uses of cost accounting information.”
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seus  Livros de Contas)] by João Baptista Bonavie in 1758 and
precedes the foundation of the Portuguese School of Commerce
(Aula do Comércio) in Lisbon in 1759.
We draw from a rich vein of under-explored archival material to provide fresh comparative counterpoints to the bulk of existing analyses of manufacturing accounting history which have
been written from a predominantly Anglo-Saxon vantage point.
We elicit information to sustain or refute existing conjectures
about manufacturing accounting developments on the Iberian
Peninsula. The results will be useful in evaluating the findings
of many previous studies. Primary sources relied upon include
several of the 1,115 accounting books written between 1734 and
1835 which are available in the ANTT. They are catalogued there
under the name of the SFC’s successor company, the Royal Silk
Factory. Appendix 1 classifies this inventory and the 34 books
accessible for the SFC’s operations in the period 1734 to 1750.
Although manufacturing and industrial accounting has
been studied in depth after the Industrial Revolution, there are
fewer case studies of such accounting before the second half
of the 19th century. This is consistent with the observations of
Carmona [2004, 2005] that “accounting history research published in international journals focuses overwhelmingly on the
narrow time segment of 1850-1940.” According to Boyns et al.
[1998, p. 398] and Boyns and Edwards [1997, p. 2], few cost
accounting texts focus on industrial accounting practice before
1750, apart from Moschetti [1610], Monteage [1683], Collins
[1697], North [1714], and Dodson [1750]. Few scholarly papers
in the English language analyze cases of manufacturing accounting before the second half of the 19th century. The principal


There is some dispute about the identity of the first Portuguese accounting
book. Yamey [1969] and Bywater and Yamey [1982, p. 9] claim that the first such
books were published in Portuguese by Bonavie (1758) and by an anonymous
author (Tratado Sobre as Partidas Dobradas por Meyo da Qual Podem Aprender a
Arrumar as Contas nos Livros (Treatise on Accounting Using Double-Entry Bookkeeping), 1764; and that both these books “correspond closely” with (plagiarize?)
Barrême’s book, Traité des Parties Doubles (Treatise on Double-Entry Bookkeeping), 1721.

This school is alleged, in the Portuguese literature at least, to be the first government-sponsored school of commerce in the world. Four subjects were taught:
arithmetic, algebra, and geometry; exchange, weights, and measures; insurance;
and the DEB method [Rodrigues et al., 2003, 2004].

According to Sá [1998, pp. 59-60], this is the first book dedicated to industrial accounting.
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exceptions are papers with an Anglo-Saxon bias [e.g., Edwards,
1989; Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell,
1991; Fleischman et al., 1995, 1996; Boyns and Edwards, 1997;
Fleischman and Tyson, 1998] and papers focusing exclusively on
examples from Spain [e.g., Carmona et al., 1997; Carmona and
Macías, 2001; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Carmona and Donoso, 2004; Gutiérrez et al., 2005; Martínez Guillén, 2005; Romero
Fúnez, 2005] and those from Italy [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and
Zan, 2005]. Several papers in languages other than English [e.g.,
in French, by Nitikin, 1994] deal with cost accounting developments in other countries. There are some comparative studies
[e.g., Boyns et al., 1998] of the similarities and differences in
industrial accounting prior to 1880 between Britain and France.
Carmona [2006] provides an instructive review of the history
of management accounting in four European Latin countries:
Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal.
We concur with Boyns and Edwards [2000], Hoskin and
Macve [2000], Fleischman and Tyson [1998], and Fleischman
et al. [1995], among others, that it is desirable to conduct
further research into cost and management accounting history
by examining business records in a wide variety of countries.
We  contend that Portugal should be one of the countries for
which such further research is needed and likely to be insightful. In Carmona’s [2006] review of management accounting
history in four countries of Continental Europe, the focus is
preponderantly on the histories of Spain and France, and to a
lesser degree Italy, with only a brief mention of the development
of management accounting in Portugal. Accordingly, this paper
adds to  extant literature by presenting, in English, an example
of cost accounting practices, 1745-1747, in a privately owned,
Portuguese, silk textiles manufacturing company. Analysis of the
SFC’s accounting system has the potential to enhance understanding because of the SFC’s distinctive geo-political context,
the time period, the SFC’s private ownership, and the strong
competition the company faced from imports and small firms.
We begin by discussing relevant previous literature on early
cost and management accounting practices. Then we present a
brief historical background of Portugal in the 18th century and
a brief historical overview of the SFC. Thereafter, we outline the
operation of the SFC’s management accounting system, highlighting its distinctive features and formative influences. The
final section discusses our findings and conclusions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
A growing body of research has concluded that sophisticated cost accounting techniques were used before the second
half of the 19th century [see, for example, Gutiérrez et al., 2005].
This is contrary to some earlier management accounting his
toriography [see Fleischman and Parker, 1991, citing Solomons,
1952; Garner, 1954; Pollard, 1965; Kaplan, 1984]. Pollard [1965],
for example, contended that high profit margins and the absence
of competition provided little incentive for firms to adopt cost
accounting during the British Industrial Revolution. However,
Fleischman and Parker [1990, p. 220] have argued that some
notable innovative cost accounting methods were used in the
U.K. between 1760 and 1850. They cite the accounting practices
of the Carron Company, a Scottish ironworks, in which the cost
accounting processes “appear to have been motivated by the
firm’s early problems with securing adequate partnership capital, attaining profitability, and maintaining liquidity.”
Carmona et al. [1997, p. 412] analyzed the cost accounting
system used by a large, state-owned tobacco factory in Spain, the
Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville (RTF). They argued that intense
competition most likely stimulated cost calculations which could
be used in a quest to improve firm efficiency and strengthen
competitive position. Nonetheless, they contended that in the
case of the RTF, linking the emergence of cost accounting purely
to the logic of profits “yields only a partial explanation of the
cost accounting phenomenon” and that the development of cost
accounting practices at the RTF was part of a strong disciplinary
regime which aimed to minimize opportunities for tobacco theft
and facilitate the surveillance of factory labor. Cost accounting techniques assumed this disciplining role, prompted by the
importance of tobacco revenue to the State Treasury. Because
of problems in ensuring effective visual supervision, the cost
accounting system calculated expected costs of direct labor and
material consumption for each phase of the production process.
In a similar vein, Carmona and Donoso [2004] studied the
role of cost accounting systems in enforcing public policy in
early regulated (monopoly) markets at the Royal Soap Factory
of Seville (RSF) (1525-1692). They found that a complex system
of cost calculation had been the basis for price negotiations for

Romero Fúnez [2005] develops this point by analyzing the regulations of the
RTF. He concludes that the RTF’s accounting system contributed to a “spirit of
discipline,” aimed at ensuring the behavior of individuals complied with requirements under the regulations.
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many years and that centuries before the advent of scientific
management in the late 19th century, the RSF’s raw materials
standards anticipated the introduction of standards based on
expectations from prior results. Martínez Guillén [2005, p. 101]
analyzed a memorandum authored by Antonio Bordázar de
Artazu in 1732 (13 years before our analysis period), in which
a costing model is presented for use in the Spanish printing
industry. Bordázar’s model is significant for two major reasons:
first, it advocates cost-based retail price calculations in order to
help challenge a monopoly within a strictly regulated market;
and second, it includes “concepts such as the imputation of indirect costs, application of interest and the separation of direct
and indirect wages. In addition, the retail price was determined
as a multiple of the total cost of the books.”
Gutiérrez et al. [2005] applied the model used by Fleisch
man and Parker [1991] and concluded that sophisticated cost
accounting practices existed in Spain before 1800. The surveys
of company practices by Fleischman and Parker [1991] and
Gutiérrez et al. [2005], although differing considerably in terms
of their political, institutional, and social contexts, both suggest
the emergence of modern cost accounting after 1760. The survey
of Spanish practices by Gutiérrez et al. [2005] was conducted
predominantly in monopoly companies and in an environment
of government (or crown) intervention. In contrast, the focus
of Fleischman and Parker [1991] was on UK companies which
were predominantly subject to private ownership and noninterventionist governments. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] contend
that sophisticated costing emerged in Spain as the cumulative
result of two sets of factors. First, there were economic factors.
Because the textile industry was open to foreign and national
competition, most managers required information for decision
making because of the business complexities they faced. Second,
there were political factors. Most factories analyzed were related
closely to the crown. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] claim that the royal
textile factories faced financial difficulties because of the high
levels of capital investment they required, the need to integrate
activities, high transport costs, and the lack of skilled workers.
Such difficulties, especially the financial one, are argued plausibly to have prompted Spanish textile companies to monitor
and control costs more closely and to use innovative accounting
techniques [Carmona and Gómez, 2002, p. 237]. Of particular
concern was the impact of fixed costs since the interest on debt
was substantial and the salaries of accountants and managers
were very high.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/5
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Fleischman et al. [1995] argue that firms focused initially on
controlling raw materials, and then turned to the development of proper techniques to evaluate and assess production
processes and operational performance. Using the accounts of
the Royal Textile Mill of Guadalajara (RTM), 1717-1744, as a
case study, Carmona and Gómez [2002] contend that the RTM’s
cost accounting techniques concentrated on control of raw
materials and waste, control of labour and management, and
allocation of overhead to determine product cost. However, because of the lack of expertise in textile manufacturing in Spain
in the early 18th century, the state-owned RTM company hired
experienced Dutch workers who received high fixed salaries. In
this context, Carmona and Gómez [2002, p. 248] found that the
“RTM deployed standards of control for labour either before, or
contemporaneously with, the implementation of standard costs
for raw materials.” Their findings are inconsistent with those
of Fleischman et al. [1995] who argue that because control of
labor requires a higher degree of sophistication than control
of raw materials, accounting controls for labor usually were
developed after accounting controls for raw materials. However, as Carmona [2005] has noted, the evidence is mixed about
whether standards for control of raw materials preceded those
for labor. Some results [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and Zan, 2005]
are consistent with those of Fleischman et al. [1995], whereas
other results show the simultaneous use of control standards for
materials and labor [Carmona et al., 1997, 2002].
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Political, Economic, and Social Context of Portugal: In the
western world of the first half of the millennium, Italian citystates, such as Venice, dominated international commerce with
the East. Their accounting was highly developed and their businessmen were well educated. However, in 1498, this dominance
was put at risk by the discovery by Portugal’s Vasco da Gama
of the sea route to India, via the Cape of Good Hope. Portugal
exploited this discovery. It gained trading advantages with Asia
and maintained them for fifty years [see Peres, 1959; Godinho,
1962, 1981; Boxer, 1969; Livermore, 1976; Serrão, 1980]. Merchants from Italian city-states came to Lisbon seeking to profit
from the Portuguese advantage, bringing with them knowledge
of DEB techniques.
Portugal’s influence as a colonizing nation flourished in
the first decades of the 16th century but was soon eclipsed by
Published by eGrove, 2007
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the rise of other major colonial powers. Portuguese affluence
began to decline during the reign of King D. João III (John III)
between 1521 and 1557. A major reason for this was the onset
of the Portuguese Inquisition in 1531. This prompted a significant number of Portuguese Jews, who had played an important
role in Portuguese discoveries, to leave the country [Kayserling,
1971; Livermore, 1976, p. 147; Tavares, 1995; Nogueira, 2001;
Rodrigues et al., 2003; Rodrigues and Craig, 2004, p. 341]. The
loss of influential merchants was accompanied also by the flight
of much capital from Portugal and the depletion of the country’s
entrepreneurial skills [Marques, 1984; Rodrigues et al., 2003].
The Portuguese Inquisition was on-going and adversely affected
many influential businessmen, progressively weakened the bourgeoisie, and helped lead Portugal to “abysm and ruin” [Kayserling, 1971, p. 284].
During the reign of King D. Pedro II (Peter II) (1668-1706),
when Portugal was under the governship of the Count of
Ericeira, the country experienced economic difficulties. It attempted to develop industry by encouraging manufacturing activity. Throughout the country, factory systems were established
to  operate in concert with artisan workshops and a domestic
cottage industry. Artisans required very little capital and lowpriced equipment. However, with the transition to manufacturing, large sums of capital and a large workforce were needed. In
1677, King D. Pedro II authorized Rolando Duclos to establish a
silk factory. A complex industrial entity with fifty silk looms and
about one thousand workers was constructed [Macedo, 1982, p.
37]. A supporting infrastructure of medieval guilds developed
around the factory. To help ensure a stable workforce, protection was given to the factory by the king. Factory workers could
not terminate their employment unless other workers were
available to replace them [Macedo, 1982, p. 251]. In the same
way, the Bragança silk factory, which was in a state of decline
at the time, was supported by the king who summoned experts
and technicians from Toledo to teach silk producers appropriate
techniques and methods [Sousa, 2005, p. 2].
During the first half of the 18th century, Portugal benefited
from the flow of diamonds and gold from Brazil. The Portuguese
court became one of the richest in Europe [Serrão, 1996]. Never
theless, the economy was under-industrialized in comparison
with other European nations [Marques, 1984; Maxwell, 1995].

Bragança is located in Trás-Os-Montes, in Portugal’s northeastern interior,
bordering Spain.
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After the death of the Count of Ericeira in 1690, interest in
manufacturing declined, so much so that in the first quarter of
the 18th century, silk manufacturing activity was conducted only
in artisan workshops and in a “cottage system” [Macedo, 1982,
p. 70].
The ideals of the Enlightenment, imported from France
during the reign of King D. João V (John V) (1706-1750), spread
slowly in Portugal. The king wanted to modernize Portugal and
expand its power, but he had only limited success. The economy
was under-industrialized and in decay. Attempts to industrialize
were not pursued as vigorously as they had been, in part because it was easier to derive wealth from shipments of gold from
Portugal’s colony in Brazil [Almeida, 1989-90, p. 1]. Portugal’s
generous commercial treaties with England also were a disincentive to industrialization [Macedo, 1982].
Applying the French model, D. João V sought to expand
his power base and to modernize the country, thereby reinforcing an absolute monarchical regime in Portugal [Livermore,
1976; Marques, 1984]. Despite such political reforms, the strong
conservatism, cultural backwardness, and religious intolerance
of Portugal provided a weak base for the adoption of Enlightenment ideals [Fonseca, 2000]. The Inquisition, through its
censorship of many books, helped suppress intellectual creativity and promoted hostility to innovation [Marques, 1984]. The
Catholic Church was wealthy and dominated teaching, but it
did not teach accounting. Rates of illiteracy were very high and
the nobility did not value education or business [Azevedo, 1929;
Rodrigues et al., 2003].
In the 1730s, interest in silk manufacturing activity was rekindled [Macedo, 1982, p. 72], but many problems had to be addressed. Administrators, for example, lacked management skills
and knowledge of how to market manufactured products effectively [Macedo, 1982, p. 72]. Portugal began to imitate French
mercantilism [Dias, 1984, pp. 142-150, 212-213). Influenced by
Colbert’s example in France, Cardeal da Mota, the prime minister of D. João V, supported the development of big to acquire
the corporations operated by privileged bourgeoisie [Falcon,
2005]. He encouraged industry to acquire the skills of foreign
artisans and craftsmen. A popular model for establishing a

From 1661, Portugal had a political alliance with England. This was strengthened in 1703 with the Metween Treaty establishing special conditions, including a
reduction in taxes, for the export of Portuguese wine to England. It also removed
restrictions on the import of English textiles into Portugal.
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manufacturing operation involved inviting a foreigner to initiate
the project, and later to invite the participation of Portuguese
partners. According to Macedo [1982, p. 72], the social and economic structure which supported Portugal’s keenness to engage
in manufacturing between 1720 and 1740 was characterized by
“improvisation,” insufficient capital, and lack of technical and
administrative skills. The SFC was regarded as one of the most
important activities of the new manufacturing era. It was the
largest manufacturing company operating during the reign of D.
João V [Almeida, 1989-90, p .2]. Although there were only a few
factories in Portugal at the time, there were many artisan workshops and many vestiges of a cottage industry system.
The accounting at the SFC, which we explore, was conducted in the transition from the cottage industry10 to the industrial revolution era. This transition period, which witnessed
the initial uses of a factory system, is often described as the
manufacturing era. To better understand the accounting at the
SFC, in a footnote we provide a brief outline of the 18th century
Portuguese systems of weight (arrátel), length (côvado), and currency (real).11
Brief History of the SFC: The SFC was created in 1734 as a private company by the Frenchman Robert Godin, with financial
support from wealthy backers and authorization from King D.
João V. Godin received a charter on February 25, 173412 from
the king, granting him many privileges, including monopoly
rights to produce silk for 20 years (no further silk factories could
be created without Godin’s permission, para. 2 of the charter),
tax exemptions for ten years from a wide variety of taxes (para.
6), no import tax on raw materials (paras. 7 and 8), exemptions
of employees from military service (para. 6), and execution of
10
This describes a system in which materials were put in an artisan’s workshop or in a person’s home to be transformed into products.
11
One arrátel was 459 grams or 16 onças (ounces). 32 arráteis (plural of arrátel)
constituted one arroba. In this paper, we represent arrátel with the notation “a.” A
côvado was 0.66 meters and was written Cdo . Percent was written as pC t
The monetary unit was a real (plural réis, and abbreviated to rs.). To indicate one thousand réis, a $ was written, followed by three zeros. Thus, 2,000 réis
was written as 2$000. A million réis was written using a colon (:). Thus, 5,000,000
réis was 5:000$000. Tables presented by Mata and Valério [1993, p. 279] help us to
understand the relationship between réis in 1745 and their conversion into euros
in 2000; approximately 25 réis in 1745 are equivalent to €1 in 2000. One thousand
réis are equivalent to approximately €39, and one million réis to €39,000.
12
Neves [1827] states that the original charter was destroyed in the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. A copy of the charter has survived.
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the company’s debts as royal debts (para. 20). However, the king
insisted also that compulsory preference be given to Portuguese
raw materials and labor (especially in the case of apprentices,
para. 14); and that the factory be audited annually by the state
(paras. 10, 11, and 12) [ANTT, Ministério do Reino, book 167,
sheet 211; ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11,
book 526, sheets 4-6 and 8V-9; Neves, 1827, pp. 25-40; Macedo,
1982, pp. 251-256].
Godin and his partners13 raised capital and formed a joint
stock company. The company produced silk products trimmed
with gold and silver, velvet, damasks, grogram, brocades, satins,
taffetas, and gold and silver laces [Santos, 2002]. The SFC enticed expert designers and craftsmen to Portugal from France
and commenced operations in a modest factory in Fonte Santana, where Godin lived. In 1738, the SFC established itself in a
new and large factory in Rato, Lisbon, even though construction
of the factory was not finished until 1741. In 1749, there were
100 assembled looms in the factory [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra,
Decretos, maço 258; Neves, 1827; Santos, 2002].
The administrators of the company were elected by the partners. They supervised three main offices: general administration,
sales administration, and accounting [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais
de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheets 4V-6V]. The directors
of the first Administration were Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal,
Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira, and Domingos da Silva Vieira. After the death of Ferraz de Oliveira and Silva Vieira, Tojal was left
as the sole administrator, but he acted with the advice of Manuel
de Sande de Vasconcelos [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos,
maço 258]. The administrators were responsible for purchases,
sales, payments, maintenance of the accounting books, and general decision making. Godin provided technical advice on the
manufacturing operations [Almeida, 1989-90].
At the end of October 1734, the capital of the company was
16 million réis (40 shares of 400$000 each). However, the capital needs increased quickly with the construction of the large
13
They were: Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, Manoel de Sande de Vasconcelos,
Francisco Xavier Ferraz de Oliveira, João de Castro Carneiro, Manoel da Costa
Pinheiro, Domingos da Silva Vieira, D. Gabriel António Gomes, Christian Stockler,
and Domingos da Cruz Lisboa. Godin did not subscribe any capital, but he was
considered to be a partner who gave to the company his knowledge and “his intelligence and activity” [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book
526, sheet V]. Godin received an annual salary of 480$000. He received a smaller
amount of dividends “because he did not deliver any capital” [ANTT, Cartórios
Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheet 6V].
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factory at Rato between 1735 and 1741 [Neves, 1827]. By May
1742, capital had risen to approximately 61.2 million réis (153
shares) [partners’ share register book (entrada de sócios) no.
980].14 Soon the company’s capital needs were such that it had
to borrow money, repayable with interest.
In addition to the manufacturing plant, the building had
six retail shops. There were several offices housing the commercial staff (a merchant specializing in sewing silk, a merchant
specializing in wool and silk, a general director of sales, a clerk
and a director of production) and the directors of the company.
Several employees of the company lived in the same building
(the bookkeeper, the clerk, and the doorkeeper). The SFC’s
staff also included silk weavers, silk manufacturers, foremen,
designers,15 sock makers, lace makers, dyers, a storekeeper,
blacksmiths,  carpenters, two cooks, a water carrier, a doctor,
and a nurse [Macedo, 1982]. In 1749, “the factory employed
200 men (specialized workers and artisans) and approximately
one thousand female silk winders. The factory also contracted
many silk throwers, gold and silver drawers, carpenters, turners,
joiners and blacksmiths” [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra, Decretos,
maço 258]. Many of the specialized foreign workers were French
[Almeida, 1989-90].
On July 3, 1745, the cashier and administrator of the SFC,
Manuel Nunes da Silva Tojal, was advised by the government
auditor that the company had sustained a very sizable operating loss of 18:796$990 from its inception through to August
1744 [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda, Maço, Decretos, 1725 e anos
seguintes]. The company’s capital had been exhausted by the
construction of the new factory in Rato. A memorial written by
Godin on September 1, 1749 revealed that the first administration had expended 31:037$875 réis building the new factory.
In the period, salaries and gratuities totalling 32:644$800 réis
were paid as well [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço
258]. Manufacturing was undertaken in the face of strong external competition from legal imports and contraband products
[Macedo, 1982, p. 72; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40], and the SFC was
not profitable.
14
This amount corresponds to 1.2% of the large amount received in gold from
Brazil in 1745 (about 5,200 million réis) [Mauro, 1991, p. 247]. Besides the capital subscription, the partners loaned the company 21:000$000, bringing the total
amount delivered by the partners to 82:200$00 (ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 258). That amount corresponds to 1.6% of the amount received in gold
from Brazil in 1745.
15
The fist designer was a Frenchman, Mr. Alezon [Santos, 2002].
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To help ease the difficult trading situation faced by the SFC,
the Companhia da China (China Company) was created in June
1741. It was granted privileges in the commercial traffic with
Macau for a period of 16 years.16 The charter of 1741 suggested
that this company “would improve both companies, consolidated in only one” [ANTT, Chancellaria de D. João V, book 102,
sheets 270V-272V]. The objective was to help the SFC obtain
silk foliage which was much cheaper in Macau than in Europe
[Almeida, 1989-90, p. 7]. The elected administrators (Christian
Stockler, Manuel Passos Dias, Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconcelos,
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal) prepared the statutes of the
new company, whose capitalization was open to public subscription. The close relationship between commercial and industrial
activities created hope that the prosperity of commerce would
extend to the manufacturing sector [Almeida, 1989-90].
On July 4, 1745, Godin requested that the king extend these
privileges for a further ten years. Godin argued that the partners
had not benefited from their investment in such a “fantastic factory, one of the biggest of its type, which has become of public
interest not only because of the silks produced but also because
of the many craftsmen employed” [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda,
Maço, Decretos, 1725 e seguintes]. However, neither the granting
of the extension of the privileges for a further ten years nor the
stopping of major expenses related to the building construction
was sufficient to help the company recover its poor financial
situation [Macedo, 1982, p. 71; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40]. The SFC’s
financial deficit made it impossible to take advantage of the
industrial and commercial privileges it had received [Macedo,
1982].
The second administration was conducted by Manoel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler, and Manoel
Nunes da Silva Tojal. Christian Stockler was a consul who
represented the City of Hamburg in Lisbon. There were serious disagreements between Godin and Stockler [ANTT,
Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 258; Almeida, 1989-90].
Godin accused Stockler of incompatibility on the grounds
that it would be impossible to promote the commercial interests of Portugal and Hamburg at the same time [ANTT,
Conselho de Guerra, Decretos, maço 258]. It seems that the
SFC’s financial problems were compounded by personality differences and discipline problems [Almeida, 1989-90]. Al16
However, since the company was in a difficult financial situation, the number of ships per year never exceeded one [Macedo, 1982].
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though Stockler was replaced17 in the third administration, the
company failed in 1750. The cause was attributed to the high
costs of property and of training personnel [Neves, 1827]. This
was not surprising in view of the criticism by Sebastião José
de Carvalho e Melo,18 better know as the Marquis of Pombal, of
the strategy the company had adopted. In a letter written from
London to Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, the secretary
of state for war and foreign affairs to King D. João V, Pombal
noted that unlike the big and expensive factory the SFC had
just constructed in Rato, in London he could see only small and
cheap factories [Macedo, 1982; Barreto, 1986]. Pombal [1741a]
contended that companies should be small and cheap to make it
easier for them to be profitable. Pombal, who was later foreign
affairs minister (1750-1755) and chief minister (1756-1777) in
the Portuguese government, had a very influential impact on
Portuguese economic thinking of the time [Rodrigues and Craig,
2004, pp. 333-337].19 It was under Pombal’s leadership that the
SFC was transformed into the Royal Silk Factory, a state-owned
enterprise.
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE SFC
The SFC factory was surrounded by houses in which strands
of raw silk were produced from silk cocoons. They were then
passed to the factory for processing into finished silk products.
The production cycle was:
silk filament Ë raw silk thread Ë dyed silk Ë
reeled silk Ë silk fabrics Ë finished silk clothes
An integrated accounting system using DEB and job-order
costing computed full costs of units produced. It was allied with
17
The third administration was conducted by Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconcelos, Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, and Francisco Ferreira da Silva.
18
He acquired the title, Marquis of Pombal, in 1769. In 1741, he was the ambassador of the Portuguese King D. João V to the English Court of King George II.
In this letter, Pombal advised the King that in England the small manufacturing
operations he observed there were not experiencing the same financial problems
as were being experienced in Portugal because the English firms did not have the
same structure and amount of costs. Pombal stated that the value of the building
where the Silk Company was established was greater than all the similar companies established in London and surrounding regions [Pombal, 1741a].
19
Pombal’s “Report on Grievances” to the king of Portugal in 1741 is regarded
by many, such as Barreto [1986], to be one of the most important expressions of
Portuguese economic thought in the first half of the 18th century.
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a charge and discharge system of accounting in which administrators and artisans were each accountable for the materials
disbursed to them. The quality of production was controlled and
the cost per côvado was computed. Artisans were discharged
from responsibility for raw materials when they forwarded
finished products. Stocks were valued at an average estimated
cost. Expense control was achieved by comparing the variance
between allocated costs and actual costs. Administrators were
responsible for controlling expenses, rendering accounts, and
paying creditors. The central account was a “finished goods”
account (fazendas em ser na mão da administração da venda das
fazendas da fábrica; literally, “finished fabrics held by the sales
administration”).
Cost Calculation and the Finished Goods Account: The computed
cost of each job was entered in the factory invoices book (livro
de facturas da fábrica). For the first job order, direct costs were
71$540 réis and indirect costs were 15$022 réis, with total costs
of 86$562 réis. The output was 66½ côvados so that the unit
cost was approximately 1$301 réis per côvado. During February 1745, 20 job orders were completed, comprising 1323.25
côvados, or approximately 873 meters of silk, at a total cost of
réis 2:776$272. Job number 1, the first of 20 pieces completed
on February 28, 1745, is recorded in the “account of cost” as follows [ANTT, book no. 676, p. 1]:
FIGURE 1
Job-Order Cost Sheet, SFC, February 28, 1745
No. 1 1 Piece -66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour produced by Loom no. 76
by Vicente Febregat
a
9 " 15 " weight of the piece [9 arratéis and 15 ounces]
a
- “ 10 " loss
a
10 " 9 " of dyed silk @ 4000 réis.
rs. 42$250
salary of the artisan and foremen @ 260 rs. per C.do [by côvado]
" 17$290
salary of the apprentice @ 150 rs. by C.do
"
9$900
Silk reeling @ 200 rs. per a [by arrátel]
"
2$100
		
" 71$540
interest @ 6 p C.t
"
4$292
general factory expenses @ 3 p C.t
"
2$146
wages @ 6 p C.t
"
4$292
letting of the house and looms @ 6 p C.t
"
4$292
			
" 86$562
st

We have 66 1/2 C.do s. The cost per côvado is 1$301 réis and the
remainder is 45½ réis.
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Full cost per côvado was defined in a fashion similar to the
French prix de revient, the total cost accounting system that
Nikitin [1990] found at Saint-Gobain between 1820 and 1880
and that Bordázar proposed in the Spanish printing industry
in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005]. As with Bordázar’s proposal,
there is an indirect imputation of costs and a separation between wages of workers directly involved with silk production
and those who were not. Estimated overheads were applied in
a consistent fashion as a set percentage of direct costs. Indirect
wages, interest, and costs of “letting of the house and looms”
were allocated at 6% of total direct costs, and general factory
expenses at 3%. Because the SFC had obtained a charter with
monopoly rights, managers believed that the fair sales price
20
could be calculated by adding the “cost price” and a fair profit.
Accordingly, calculation of the “cost price” (full cost of products)
was most important. Note that at the RTM of Guadalajara in
1742, indirect salaries of “the superintendent and the personnel
employed in the accounting and cash offices and in the warehouses” were allocated (at the rate of one-eighth of their yearly
wages) to the cost of the white twill [Carmona and Gómez, 2002,
p. 246]. It is also relevant to note that in the costing model proposed by Bordázar in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005], cost was
increased by 5% per year to reflect the financial interest costs
likely to be incurred in storing finished goods (books) for several
years. In the case of the SFC, the imputation of interest costs
arose because the company had to borrow a large sum of money
to construct the new factory in Rato.
The integration of cost accounting and financial accounting
can be seen in the journal and ledger. For instance, at the end of
February, the following entry was recorded in the journal [ANTT,
book no. 720, pp. 13-14]:
DR.
CR.

Finished Goods
Creditors21

2:776$272
2:776$272

During the month of February, 20 pieces of silk were produced by the looms and were delivered to the Administration:

20
This reasoning was wrong since, as Sousa [2005] argues, the silk industry
was the most important sector of Trás-os-Montes. Records show that in 17211724, Bragança had 30 registered spinning wheels and 350 looms. Freixo de Espada à Cinta, another city in the region, had more than 100 looms.
21
“Creditors” here means all costs that contribute to the finished goods.
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FIGURE 2
Items Transferred to Finished Goods Inventory, SFC,
February 1745
1st Piece – 66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour
2nd Piece – 46 1/2 côvados of black and silver grogram
3rd Piece – 74 côvados of black Grodetur
4th Piece – 100 côvados of black Grodetur
5th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of white and gold grogram
6th Piece – 80 côvados of black skirt
7th Piece – 44 3/4 côvados of purple and gold satin
(7 pieces – 457 côvados)
(next page)
(7 pieces – 457 côvados)
8th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of purple and gold satin
9 th Piece – 94 côvados of mantles
10th Piece – 92 côvados of white serge
11th Piece – 99 1/2 côvados of mantles
12th Piece – 89 côvados of black Nobreza
13th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of green grogram
14th Piece – 48 côvados of blue Persiana
15th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of silver grogram
16th Piece – 68 1/2 côvados of black grogram
17th Piece – 66 côvados of brilliant gold colour
18th Piece – 36 côvados of white and gold damask
19th Piece – 92 côvados of brilliant cinnamon-colour
20th Piece – 48 côvados of black skirts
20 pieces – 1323 ¼ côvados

Dyed silks of 20 pieces
Expenses of artisans and foremen of 20 pieces
Expenses of apprentices of 20 pieces
Silk reeling
Interests
Factory general expenses
Wages
Letting the house, factory and looms
Gold, silver strand
		

86$562
157$344
98$701
135$713
187$755
144$728
340$314
1:151$117
1:151$117
349$374
82$103
58$170
84$268
64$363
96$025
68$216
263$422
81$535
70$336
191$134
118$039
98$180
2:776$272

935$875
444$205
230$509
46$294
137$684
68$337
137$684
137$684
2:138$272
638$000
2:776$272

The double-entry system facilitated computation of the value of
finished goods at the end of the period (2:776$272). Such a value
was computed using information in the account that recorded
the cost of each job order. For example, the cost of the first piece
(86$562) was the first debit in the finished goods account. This
sum was obtained from the invoice book, the book of cost account. Such a treatment provides evidence of the integration
of the SFC’s cost and financial accounting systems. The SFC’s
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integration of costing procedures into its double-entry accounting system, like such systems elsewhere, had the potential to
give “managers improved control over operations” [Edwards
and Newell, 1991, p. 48]. This was because there was less chance
of omitting costs within the more secure double-entry accounting framework. All transactions which supported the costing of
products were recorded. The SFC provides evidence additional
to that gathered for the coal, iron, and steel industries to show
that the “two branches into which accounting is today conventionally categorized – financial and costing – rather than developing from separate beginnings, as was previously believed, in
certain industries at least grew naturally out of a single system”
(Boyns and Edwards, 1997, p. 20]. At the SFC, costing information was provided jointly with important information about
products.
During the SFC’s second administration, there were 663 job
orders for silk products and monthly orders for silk stockings.
Product costs were determined as full costs, using a job-order
costing system. Each job order included, as direct costs, dyed
silk at an estimated cost based on weight (including a shrinkage
loss), salaries of artisans and foremen (paid by piece), salaries
of apprentices (paid by piece), and silk reeling (paid by weight
unit). Indirect costs were comprised of interest (6% of direct
costs), factory general expenses and indirect materials (3% of
direct cost), indirect labor wages (6% of direct cost), and rent on
the house, factory, and looms (6% of direct cost).
Materials were valued at an estimated average cost, a rudimentary form of standard cost. A particularly interesting feature
of line 2 of the job cost sheet for Job No. 1 is that the weight
of materials included an allowance of approximately 6% (10
ounces) for losses due to spoilage and shrinkage. The recognition of materials wastage was observed also by Zan [2004] in
managerial and accounting discourse at the Venice Arsenal,
and by Carmona and Gómez [2002] at the RTM of Guadalajara. Artisans, foremen, and apprentices were paid by piece rate.
Manufacturing overheads, interest, non-manufacturing wages,
and building and equipment repair were included at a predetermined percentage of direct costs. The SFC was also one of
the early entities to include interest in the identification of costs,
as was the case with the Essex textile manufacturer, Thomas
Griggs, 1742-1760, noted by Edwards [1989].
Further, as with other firms noted by Edwards and Newell
[1991], the SFC was aware of the imperative to recoup all its
costs. This provided an incentive to control costs, particularly
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/5
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during periods when market conditions squeezed profit levels.
Total costs were expressed as averages, in cost units of “cost per
covâdo.” (See Figure 1 where the unit cost of job order no. 1 was
approximately 1$301 réis per covâdo.) Such averages would have
been useful for control and efficiency assessment since these
“units could be compared over time to provide indicators of
changes in production costs of the pieces of silk and compared
with the market price” [Edwards and Newell, 1991, p. 46]. The
SFC had some controls over material usage, as we explain later.
Although it was possible to exercise some control over payments
made to each artisan and foreman, control of labor efficiency
seems to have been lacking because foremen and artisans were
paid according to the amount of production they completed.
Overheads were calculated as a percentage of direct costs
as outlined earlier. But, as Gutiérrez et al. [2005, p. 131] note,
“different foundations” for overhead allocation were used in the
management accounting systems of the 13 large and mediumsized 18th century Spanish companies they examined. The “storage costs” of the Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray were allocated
on a flat rate of seven reales per unit and “damages and contingencies” at 1.5% of production costs. The notion of “ability to
bear” was an instrumental determinant of overhead allocation
because “baling cost and the managers’ and accountants’ wages
were allocated at a different rate for each type of fabric depending on its class – allowing higher rates for higher quality fabrics”
(emphasis added).
The fact that the cost of each job order was computed in
the “invoice book” leads to the belief that a major objective
of product costing at the SFC was to compute selling price.
Although the SFC had been granted monopoly rights by the government to produce silk in Portugal, it suffered strong competition from small and big factories which were in operation when
the SFC was created. The competition between the SFC and the
companies from Trás-os-Montes is recognized by Sousa [2005,
p. 3] who argues that “the second industrial boom (1720-1740),
during the reign of D. João V, did not seem to have any positive
impact on the revival of the Trás-os-Montes silk industry. On the
contrary, the establishment of the Rato silk factory in Lisbon
led to a fall in the demand for silk fabrics from Trás-os-Montes.”
Most importantly, national silk fabrics were subject to competition from untaxed imported goods. King D. João V’s government adopted a policy of taxing silk exports but allowing silk
imports to remain tax-free. This arrangement made export and
national sales very difficult for the SFC to achieve. “This was a
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fatal mistake for agriculture and even more for manufacturing.
Later, all developed nations, as did our King D. José I, adopted
the opposite policy of facilitating exports and shutting out imports” [Neves, 1827, p. 41]. To suggest that the SFC determined
its own prices would be an over-simplification because prices
for silk and silk products were influenced by market forces and
governmental economic policy. Selling prices were not a function of cost plus a mark-up, but could vary. This can be seen by
comparing sales prices and full costs by job order (in réis) in the
following examples [ANTT, comparison of books 676 and 978]:
FIGURE 3
Job Cost/Sales Price Comparisons, 1745, SFC
Job	Total	Sales
	No.	Cost	Price
10
631
620
18
5$309
5$200
29
1$988
1$800
35
1$030
960
40
1$403
1$300

(Loss)
(11)
(109)
(188)
(70)
(103)

This comparison suggests that there were difficulties in selling
finished product. Indeed, the company’s sales were low in comparison to its level of production. As with the textiles factories
in Ezcaray and Guadalajara [Gutiérrez et al., 2005, p. 136], the
SFC had trouble selling its products in the market. Its costs were
higher than the prevailing sales prices.
Other Important Accounts: The account “administration of
fabric sales” (administração das vendas das fazendas da fabrica)
was a partial profit and loss summary account [ANTT, book
no. 978]. Sales of silk fabrics were credited to this account,
and the full applied cost of goods sold debited, with an amount
transferred from the finished goods account. The resulting balance, representing the expected trading surplus for the period,
was transferred to the profit and loss account. The actual profit
would have differed from this expected profit if, as was usual,
there were differences between actual costs and applied costs.
The profit and loss statement served mainly as “a weeding-out
process, in which the detailed and unwanted information in the
ledger was removed” [Yamey, 1977, p. 23].
Two other important accounts were “dyed silks” (sedas
tintas) and “general factory expenses” (gastos gerais da fabrica)
[ANTT, ledger, book 718]. The dyed silks account was credited
with the estimated costs to produce dyed silk and debited with
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/5
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the actual costs incurred. The difference was transferred to the
profit and loss account. “Dyed silks” was also an account on
the balance sheet that was debited with the opening stock and
credited with closing stock when charging the new administration. The “general factory expense” account was credited with
applied cost and debited with actual cost; it was also a balance
sheet debit account. The actual profit would have differed from
this expected profit if, as would be usual, there were differences
between actual costs, including actual overhead costs, and the
applied costs, including applied overhead costs.
As Nikitin [1994] found in the cost accounting at the Forges
D’Oberbrück Company (1738-1745), the cost accounting system
revolved around the inventory accounts. However, at the SFC,
the cost system was more sophisticated. The cost accounts and
finished goods account were debited with the actual costs and
credited with estimated costs. The differences were transferred
to the profit account. The balance of the account “administration of fabric sales” showed the difference between sales and
total estimated cost. The profit and loss account was composed
of this value and the differences between actual and estimated
costs. As with Bordázar’s cost accounting model [Martínez Guillén, 2005], the profit and loss statement did not include depreciation expense. Whenever a fixed asset had to be repaired, the
cost was simply booked as an expense against the period.
Charge and Discharge System and DEB: In the transition from
the first to the second administration, the company’s accounting
system was a mixture of agency bookkeeping or “charge and discharge” accounting and a system of double-entry accounting incorporating several costing procedures. The main characteristic
of agency bookkeeping “is that the party reporting would charge
himself with the values he became responsible for and discharge
himself in the records for every release from responsibility
regardless of the cause” [Littleton, 1933, p. 2]. Agency bookkeeping systems were more common before the arrival of the Italian
method of DEB. They were gradually abandoned around the
middle of the 18th century when the transition from charge and
discharge accounting to double-entry accounting, and the integration of the two systems, gained momentum [Jones, 1985, p.
41]. Administrators at the SFC, particularly the cashier, Manoel
Nunes da Silva Tojal, were responsible to promoters of the company for the capital resources placed in their hands. They were
charged with these resources at the beginning of their administration [ANTT, book 718, pp. 4-8] and discharged at the end
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[ANTT, book 720, pp. 192-197], as the opening page of the journal book (jornal) shows clearly. The inventory at the beginning
of a new administration was important. It helped to establish
what was owned by the company, what it owed creditors, and
what its administration was accountable for. The words at the
top of the inventory account state explicitly “this is the inventory
delivered by the former administration to the new administrators Mssrs. Manoel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler,
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal who will be obliged to pay to
creditors, not only the capital but also the interest from now on
22
and these are the effects [assets] that are being received.” The
February 1, 1745 inventory appears as Figure 4 [ANTT, book no.
718, pp. 4-8].
FIGURE 4
Inventory, February 1, 1745, SFC
Dyed silks
6:655$062
Raw silks
4:712$606
Silks in foliage
277$750
Raw silk strand
168$187
Dyed silk strand
25$510
Alducar for borders
8$276
Possolos and waste
108$021
Gold and silver strand
3:213$634
General factory expenses
339$000
Soap
112$761
Clothes awaiting shipment to Macao to Belchior Araújo Costa & Cª
3:880$580
Finished clothes
9:259$362
João José del Rey (debtor)
1:872$000
Pedro Villela (debtor)
252$000
Rev (Priest) José Oliveira da Patriarcal (debtor)
685$903
Francisco Sparsa Tintoreiro (dyer)
139$873
		
31:710$525
less what we owe to Mr. Manuel Nunes Silva Tojal
by his disbursement
 12:800$000
		
18:910$525
payment of the above 18:910$525 is to be made by this administration to the
following creditors:
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery of St. Marta
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery
of the Mother of God, Guimarães (...)
Patricio Pires Quaresma
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus by the hand of
Manoel de Sande e Vasconcelos
Rev. Priest José Dias of the Oratório Congregation
		

6:000$000
600$000
1:350$000
4:800$000
4:800$000
1:000$000
365$525
18:910$525

22
Nikitin [1990] found the same word used to refer the inventory value of all
assets of the Saint-Gobain Company.
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The company’s inventory account of 31:710$525 was comprised
of inventories of direct and indirect materials, finished goods,
and amounts owing from customers. This inventory had been
financed through the deposit of 12:800$000 by the cashier and
through loans of 18:910$525, principally from the Church. It was
necessary to resort to such loans to overcome the lack of capital
and to help meet the high costs of building the factory and
houses. Therefore, the sum of the charge (31:710$525) exceeded
that of the discharge (18:910$525) and measured the indebtedness of the new administration to the cashier, Manoel Nunes da
Silva Tojal. From reading the Cash Account in the ledger, we can
ascertain that the cashier deposited 12:800$000 on February 1,
1745 and received it back on February 28, 1745.
As Lemarchand [1994] points out, the charge and discharge
model depended on the separation between capital ownership
and management, centered on notions of responsibility accounting, and resembled certain aspects observed in early joint-stock
companies. However, it seems that the inability of the singleentry bookkeeping system to cope fully with the complexity of
the SFC became evident in the first administration, prompting it
to adopt a DEB system in its second administration. As Macedo
[1982] argues, this period is characterized by “improvisation” in
terms of managerial activities. This change can be understood in
a context where DEB began to be seen in Portugal as a system
of rational beliefs23 through which organizational structure is
legitimized. As already noted, on July 3, 1745 the government
auditor presented his report dated August 31, 1744. He con
cluded that the losses were a consequence of the large amount of
interest the company was paying on the substantial loans it had
obtained to finance construction of the factory buildings [ANTT,
Conselho da Fazenda, Maços, Decretos, 1725 e anos seguintes].
The prospect of changing to an accounting system which facilitated the control of interest costs by charging them to the cost of
the products would probably have been appealing.
Salaries and Wages: As with the RTM in Spain [Carmona and
Gómez, 2002, p. 233], Portugal had to hire foreign workers
to provide technical skills in production and accounting. The
salaries paid were very high as the wages for the three months
to March 1745, shown below, reveal [ANTT, book no. 720]:
23
The system of rational beliefs is evident in Pombal’s [1741b] treatise in
which he concludes that the DEB system was being used successfully by merchants in London.
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Roberto Godin, factory manager
Nicolao Julio Cortinovis, bookkeeper
Carlos Roland, silk printer
João G. Rebelo
Bento Ferreira, Roberto Godin’s
keeper (February/March)
Matias Patrão, factory porter

120$000
50$000
75$000
45$000
12$000
7$200

309$200

By the end of the second administration (1747), the salary of
the bookkeeper (Cortinovis,24 effectively the SFC’s accountant)
increased from 50$000 to 75$000 for a three month period. The
best paid workers, Godin (the factory manager), Cortinovis, and
Roland (a silk printer), had foreign names.
Balance Sheet: The balance sheet was very different from its
equivalents today; it did not include capital, fixed assets, or
depreciation. The accounting system was based on debits and
credits not on assets and liabilities. This made it difficult to
calculate the net worth of the company. But this did not seem to
bother the proprietors of the SFC who were concerned principally with controlling agency relationships. Figure 5 is the October 31, 1747 balance sheet [ANTT, book no. 720]:
FIGURE 5
Balance Sheet, SFC, October 31, 1747
Débito (Debit)
Shag and raw silks		
Raw silks in foliage 		
Raw alducar for border 		
Raw silk strand 		
Dyed silks 		
Colour dyed alducar		
Colour dyed muzzle		
Silk wastes		
Gold and silver strand		
Factory general expenses 		
Dye 		
Soap for silk baking 		
Silk samples 		

9:154$210
650$725
27$312
178$509
10:322$525
5$550
15$875
147$004
1:903$132
413$530
599$095
64$550
60$375

24
Lourenço Cortinovis was from Venice and was the nominated consul of Portugal in Venice in 1720 [ANTT, Registo Geral de Mercês, D. João V, book 84, sheet
117-V]. Our conjecture is that Nicolao Cortinovis was a relative, but we could not
find evidence to substantiate this. The earthquake Lisbon sustained in 1755 de
stroyed documents dealing with foreign affairs matters.
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Finished clothes held by sales administration
		
[silk retail
		
stocking pairs
Shipment to Macao held by Caetano da Silva & Co.
Patriarchal Holy Church and for the Reverend Abbot José Oliveira
Cardinal of Motta (Prime Minister)
Maurício Henrique and João Andrade Dias
António Fragozo (debt of the Princes)
António José, artisan of this factory
Francisco Duarte, artisan of this factory
Cash 		
		
Crédito (Credit)
Monsignor Mattos 		
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga 		
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus
Mother Abbess and other religious persons,
Convent of Saint Apolónia		
Marcos António de Araújo Coutinho
Jozé Rebello Palhares 		
Macao Company		
Ana Dorotheia de Sande Vasconcelos
Maria Custódia do Sacramento and her religious sisters in
the Monastery of Saint Marta
Mother Abbess and other religious persons of the Monastery of
God Mother of Guimarães		
Patrício Pires Quaresma 		
		
Profit and Loss		
		

81
43:870$418
42:208$726
1:661$692]
2:087$050
83$653
21$600
2:322$595
151$250
6$325
6$000
4:238$191
76:329$474

1:600$000
6:000$000
600$000
1:000$000
2:500$000
400$000
4:000$000
17:000$000
30:540$700
1:350$000
4:800$000
4:800$000
74:590$700
1:738$774
76:329$474

The balance sheet was concerned with chargeable values that
needed closer control, so fixed assets and capital accounts were
not included. Measuring the value of the company was not important.
The debits appear to comprise cash and amounts paid in respect of inventories (direct materials, indirect materials, finished
goods in store, finished goods in transit), advances for wages of
artisans, and amounts owing from customers and other debtors.
Most of the credits comprise amounts owing on capital loans to
the Catholic Church which, in this period, was acting as a bank.
The excess of the debits over the credits was regarded as profit.
The financial situation of the SFC reveals total indebtedness of 74:590$700. A large amount of the assets (43:870$418 of
76:329$474) was represented by finished goods inventory. There
was also an imbalance between inventories of raw materials
and goods in process (22:981$858 or 30.1% of total assets) and
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inventories of finished goods (57.5% of total assets). The SFC
appears to have been suffering from overproduction and poor
marketing.
DISCUSSION
In the SFC’s second administration, administrators were
faced with a challenging socio-economic climate. Their response, which included enhancements to the SFC’s accounting
system, offers support to “Fleischman and Parker’s hypothesis
that accounting innovations were often the product of perceptive businessmen struggling with real problems” [Boyns and
Edwards, 1995, p. 48].
Further, the SFC’s adoption of more elaborate calculative
routines might be conceived as reflecting “specific rationales
and ideals of order which the state valued and sought for the
governance of society” [Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. The French
mercantilist ideas that were spreading in Portugal prompted the
development of industry and state control. The SFC had been
granted privileges, monopoly rights and some tax exemptions,
from the state, and was to be audited by a government auditor. Because of this, the accounting system of the SFC might be
perceived as “enrolled in certain pursuits of the state and as
assuming ‘its place alongside other practices of Government’”
[Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. King D. João V and Prime Minister
Cardeal da Mota wanted to add to the power and independence
of Portugal, and attempted to do this by embracing the ideals of
French mercantilism, particularly Colbert’s ideas. This required
the SFC to institute an efficient and modern system of bookkeeping which would allow good control and oversight of operations. The calculative routines used by the SFC were capable of
improving the company’s control of operations, and accorded
with the state-sponsored mercantilist ethic of the time.
The development of several of the cost accounting practices
evident at the SFC is often attributed to the factory system of
the industrial revolution [Littleton, 1933; Johnson, 1981]. The
accounting system observed at the SFC, 1745-1747, is consistent
with Garner’s [1954] argument that the initial impetus for the
development of cost accounting was to replace the domestic system of production with the capitalist processes of production,
and that the British Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) was not
the main stimulus for change but merely accelerated the pace of
pre-existing change.
The SFC’s accounting system is noteworthy also because
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it integrated the cost and financial records in a DEB system
that included elements of a charge and discharge accounting
(or agency bookkeeping) system. The SFC operated a job-order
costing system that allocated overhead costs to products, allowed for direct materials shrinkage, and included interest cost
as an indirect product cost. Elements of a rudimentary standard
raw material costing system were evident. The SFC’s balance
sheet did not include fixed assets, accumulated depreciation,
or a statement of owners’ equity. The profit and loss account
included interest costs but not depreciation expense.
The cost and management accounting practices used by the
SFC support the contention [e.g., by Fleischman and Parker,
1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Boyns and Edwards,
1997] that many of the cost and management accounting procedures used today had origins and exemplars prior to the British
Industrial Revolution, particularly in the first half of the 18th
century. The SFC’s cost accounting practices are also consistent
broadly with case descriptions of the accounting systems that
were used in Spain in the first half of the 18th century [Carmona
et al., 1997; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Gutiérrez et al., 2005].
The example of the accounting system at the SFC adds
weight to the contention that the development of management
accounting was a response to multiple influences, and that it
ought not to be explained in terms of any single variable alone,
such as the level of industrialization, the relative impact of fixed
and variable costs, or the organizational structure of business
activity [Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991]. The cost
and management practices of the SFC are a rich source for further enquiry. The inventory of 34 accounting books of the SFC,
listed in Appendix 1, are an under-explored archival resource
that merits closer enquiry by scholars fluent in the Portuguese
language. Such enquiry might explore the transformation of the
SFC into a state-owned company in the 1750s under the leadership of Pombal, perhaps helping us to understand the “interrelations of accounting and the state” and accounting change
[Miller, 1990, p. 316]. In particular, the transition to state ownership may shed light on how ownership structure affects the cost
and financial accounting systems of business entities.
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APPENDIX 1
Inventory of Accounting Books of the
Real Fábrica das Sedas
This inventory of 1115 accounting books includes 34 for the Companhia da Fábrica das Sedas:
	Period
1.1 Accounting
1.1.1 Main accounting books
			 Ledger (Livro Mestre)
1745-47
			 Journal (Livro Jornal)
1745-47
			 Inventory
1745
1.1.2 Auxiliary accounting books
			 Cash
1746
			 Account of the amount the house cost
1735-44
			 Partnerships entries
1734-42
			 Sheet of the partners’ interest
1735-47
				
1738-47
				
1735-54
				
1735-45
				
1738-50
			 Current accounts of partnerships
1734-45
			 Invoices from abroad
1745-47
				
1747-49
			 Shipments
1735-45
			 Debtors waste-book
1735-49
				
1747-48
			 Foremen wages
1745-47
				
1747-50
			 Several accounts waste-book
1745-47
1.2 Crude Silk Warehouse and Materials
1.2.1 Warehouse
			 Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1734-45
				
1747-51
			 Entrance and exit of silk to the socks factory 1747-50
1.2.2 Dye-house
			 Dyers account
1747-50
1.3 Tint Silk Warehouse
1.3.1 Warehouse
			 Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1745-47
				
1747-50
1.3.2 Silk clothes
			 Computation of the cost of silk cloth (the
1745-46
			 original title of this book was “Invoices book”) 1746-47
1.4 Sale
1.4.1 Sale warehouse
			 Entrance and exit of silk cloth
1734-45
				
1745-47
				
1747-50
1.4.2 Shop of the company at Douradores Street
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Book No.

718
720
214
267
536
980
303
304
305
306
537
797
516
523
712
520
530
521
290
522

1054
1050
1051
289

574
1049
676
675

1020
978
621
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			 Entrance and exit of silk cloth
			 Sales of the shop waste-book
				

89
1747-50
1745-48
1747-50

1048
758
524

These books are related to the three administrations in the following way, with
some common to two or three administrations:
	Administration
1
2
3
1,2
2,3
1,2,3	Total
Main accounting books		
3					
3
Auxiliary accounting books
5
4
3
2		
3
17
Crude silk warehouse
1		
3				
4
Tint silk warehouse		
2
1		
1		
4
Sales
1
1
3		
1		
6
Total
7
10
10
2
2
3
34

Published by eGrove, 2007

33

